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　This	 text	 is	 intended	 to	 offer	 some	
observations	on	what	 is	generically	referred	
to	as	 the	‘theory	of	 the	 firm’.	 It	 is	 clear	
that	we	 shall	 not	 attempt	 to	 address	 all	 of	
the	 (extremely	 vast)	 issues	 raised	 by	 the	
development	of	this	theory.	Our	main	concern	
is	neither	to	make	an	exhaustive	summary	of	
the	different	approaches	nor	to	reconstruct	a	
new	theoretical	model	of	general	significance.	
Rather,	it	is	our	intention	to	initiate	a	dialogue	
with	 the	advocates	of	 the	various	axiomatic	
models.	This	dialogue	will	 be	based	on	 the	
empirical	 knowledge	 that	we	 have	 been	
able	 to	 accumulate	during	 twenty	years	 in	
the	 course	 of	 our	 comparative	 research	on	
relations	between	the	firm	and	society.
　In	the	 first	part,	we	 	review	the	different	
currents	of	the	theory	of	the	firm	developped	
over	 the	 past	 twenty-five	 years	 in	 the	
light	 of	Neoclassical	 theory.	 In	 the	 second	
part , 	 we	 focus	 our	 remarks	 on	 a	 new	
vision	 of	 the	 firm,	based	on	 the	 concept	 of	
'competence	accumulation',	which	 is	part	of	
the	 'evolutionary'	 approach	 that	 has	 itself	
emerged	 from	 the	 'theory	 of	 technological	
innovation'.	Finnally,	we	 	discuss	about	 the	
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possible	contribution	of	‘societal	approach’	
developed	 by	 the	 Aix	 group . 1	 In	 our	
conclusion,	we	attempt	 to	 frame	a	possible	
path	 for	the	‘institutionalist’	theory	of	 the	
firm	which	aims	to	integrate	the	firm	into	its	
social	and	institutional	contexts.
Ｉ. Theories of the firm: an overview 
　Neo c l a s s i c a l 	 e c o n om i c 	 t h e o r y 	 i s	
characterised	by	 a	high	 level	 of	 analytical	
abstraction	where	the	firm	is	reduced	to	the	
production	 function,	 and	 such	an	analytical	
bias	corresponds	to	an	extreme	simplification	
of	 the	economic	reality.	This	point	has	been	
for	a	 longtime	criticized	by	some	academics	
(Coase	1937;	Hodgson,	Mäki,	MacClosky	1992)	
for	its	lack	of	realism.	By	contrast,	the	theory	
of	 the	 firm	 recently	 developed,	 regardless	
of	 its	different	currents,	 is	situated	at	a	 less	
normative	 level	where	 the	 firm	acquires	 a	
semi-autonomous	status	 in	a	kind	of	dualism	
between	the	market	and	the	organisation.	The	
latter	is	thus	concerned	with	both	the	source	
of	the	efficiency	of	organisational	co-ordination-
-as	opposed	to	co-ordination	by	market	price-
-and	the	efforts	of	 the	agents	making	up	the	
firm	 to	gain	 the	 'organisational	quasi-rent'.２	
The	firm	is	thus	conceived	as	the	nexus	of	the	
contracts	concluded	-implicitly	or	explicitly-	by	
the	multiple	(and	differently	motivated)	agents	
who	 interact	 in	 the	course	of	production	as	
well	as	in	the	distribution	of	added	value.
　Unl ike 	 the 	 s tandard 	 theory 	 wh ich	
assimilates	 the	enterprise	 to	 the	basic	unit	
of	 technical	 or	mechanical	 choices,	 here	
the	concept	of	 the	 firm	 is	enhanced	by	 the	
addition	of	new	dimensions:
　-	Over	time,	the	firm	structures	the	multiple	
relations	with	the	various	agents	rather	than	
limiting	 itself	 to	 sporadic	exchanges	on	 the	
markets.
TABLE : Comparison of three approaches
Agency	theory Transaction	costs	theory Theory	of	co-
operative	games	
Reasons	for	
the	emergence	
of	the	firm
Incompleteness	of	the	
contract;	assymmetrically	
imperfect	information
Limited	rationality;
weakness	of	the	markets;	
uncertainty	tied	to	specific	
goods	transactions	
Importance	of	human	
resources	as	a	'collective	
asset'	specific	to	the	firm
Forms	of	co-
ordination	
within	the	firm
Hierarchical
(organisation	of	ex-ante	
contractual	incentives	in	
hierarchical	chain)	
Hierarchical
(hierarchical	administration	
of	the	distribution	of	
production	factors)
Hierarchical	and	horizontal
(autonomous	between	
wage-earners)
Distribution	of	
the	'quasi-rent'
Appropriation	by	the
firm's	owner	
(shareholder)
Appropriation	by
the	firm's	owner
(shareholder)
Sharing	between	
shareholder	and
wage-earners
Management	
criterion
(optimisation)
Profit	maximisation
(maximisation	of	the	value
	of	the	firm's	stocks)	
Minimisation	of
transaction	costs
Weighting	of	shareholder	
and	wage-earner	interests
１Aix	group	is	composed	of	a	dozen	of	researchers	based	on	the	LEST	laboratory	in	France	who	are	searching	for	a	new	
approach	to	apprehend	the	nature	of	the	firm.	Their	bibliographic	references	are	quoted	at	the	last	page.
２According	to	Coase	 (1937),	 in	the	market	economy,	 	 the	firm	only	has	a	reason	to	exist	 if	 it	allows	greater	efficiency	
(i.e.	economic	efficiency	of	transaction	costs).	Such	an	advantage	in	relation	to	the	market	should	theoretically	result	in	
a	'surplus'	which	would	remain	after	the	payment	of	all	the	production	factors	at	market	price.	Aoki	calls	this	kind	of	
surplus	an	'organisational	quasi-income'.
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　It	is	itself	an	 'organised'	structure,	and	this	
self-organisation	 has	 costs	which	may	 be	
compared	to	market	costs.
　-	 It	 is	not	 only	a	 recipient	 for	but	 also	 a	
creator	of	collective	knowledge.
　-	 It	 represents	 an	 arena	 for	 continual	
trade-offs	amongst	 the	potentially	divergent	
interests	of	the	different	players.
　In	 spite	 of	 certain	 points	 of	 consensus,	
however,	 the	 theory	 of	 the	 firm	 hardly	
r ep r e s en t s 	 a 	 h omogeneou s 	 b ody 	 o f	
interpretations.	On	 the	contrary,	 it	 includes	
different	 approaches	which	 compete	with	
each	other	and	take	various	positions	relative	
to	 standard	Neoclassical	 theory.	Three	 of	
these	may	be	singled	out	by	way	of	example:	
the	 agency	 theory,	which,	 closest	 to	 the	
Neoclassical	model,	takes	the	price	mechanism	
into	 account;	 the	 transaction	 cost	 theory	
(Williamson	1975),	 for	which	 the	 enterprise	
is	basically	defined	by	default	relative	to	the	
weakness	of	 the	markets;	and	 the	 theory	of	
co-operative	 games,	which	 gives	 the	most	
positive	definition	of	 the	 firm	and	above	all	
raises	very	 interesting	possibilities	 for	 the	
institutionalist	reformulation	of	the	firm.
　In	 order	 to	 simplify	 the	 argument,	 the	
following	 table	 offers	 a	 schematic	 view	 of	
these	three	approaches.
　This	 summary	 comparison	 of	 the	 three	
approaches	brings	out	a	certain	convergence	
in	 their	methodological	 orientations:	 all	 of	
them	attempt	to	analyse	 'economic	efficiency'	
(between	the	market	and	the	organisation	or	
between	the	different	kinds	of	organisation).	
At	 the	 same	 t ime , 	 i t 	 reveals 	 a	 fa ir ly	
considerable	divergence	in	the	way	that	each	
construes	 the	 firm	and	 its	consequences	 for	
the	different	interpretive	dimensions.
　According	 to	agency	 theory,	which	 is	 the	
most	 consistent	with	 standard	Neoclassical	
theory,	 the	 basic	 postulate	 is	 that	 the	
shareholder,	who	is	the	only	legitimate	owner	
and	risk-taker,	appropriates	the	totality	of	the	
organisational	quasi-rent	through	hierarchical	
co-ordination	 and	 remunerates	 the	 other	
agents	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 marginal	
productivity	(Alchian	and	Demsetz	1972).	The	
question	 that	 arises	 is	how	hierarchical	 co-
ordination	manages	 to	 ensure	 shareholder	
interest	when	 it	 employs	 agents	who	 do	
not	 necessarily	 share	 this	 interest	 or	may	
even	be	opposed	to	 it.	The	 logic	 involved	 in	
solving	 this	 problem	 relies	 on	 (successive)	
contractual	 incentives	between	the	principal	
and	 the	 agent:	 the	 shareholder	 delegates	
strategic	decision-making	power	to	company	
management	by	contract.	This	contract	 thus	
regulates	 ex-ante	 the	 relationship	between	
effort	and	reward	 (under	 the	supervision	of	
the	board	of	directors).	Management	 in	 turn	
parcels	out	operational	decision-making	power	
to	the	middle	managers,	who	agree	to	assume	
this	responsibility	in	exchange	for	appropriate	
compensation;	 these	managers	 intervene	at	
the	 level	of	operational	objectives	to	mobilise	
the	 rank	and	 file,	who	adjust	 their	 level	 of	
effort	according	to	the	wages	offered	 (theory	
of	efficiency	wages).
　Such	 hierarchical	 co-ordination,	 which	
corresponds	to	the	Taylorist	model,	functions	
through	 a	 chain	 of	 contractual	 incentives	
alternating	monetary	stimulation	with	market	
sanctions.	 Even	 in	 a	world	 of	 incomplete	
information,	this	mechanism	is	thus	supposed	
to	guarantee	the	maximisation	of	stock	values	
in	 conformity	with	 the	 shareholder's	 initial	
interest	(Jensen		and	Meckling	1976).
　According	 to	 the	 transaction	 theory	
(Williamson	1975),	the	basis	of	the	firm	is	the	
−	45	−
現代ビジネス研究
ex-post	economy	of	 transaction	costs	relative	
to	 the	 classic	market	 exchange.	 Indeed,	
the	 integration	 of	 certain	 specific	 assets--
which	the	market	 is	not	able	to	provide--into	
the	organisation	allows	 the	minimisation	of	
transaction	 costs	 through	 the	 reduction	 of	
uncertainty	 (tied	 to	 the	 limited	 rationality)	
and	 the	 opportunism	of	 the	 players.	Once	
the	boundaries	 of	 the	 firm	are	determined	
through	comparative	calculation,	the	principle	
of	hierarchical	organisation	 is	 systematically	
applied	 within	 the	 firms	 for	 reasons	 of	
allocative	efficiency:	hierarchical	co-ordination	
serves	 to	 centralise	 the	 most	 relevant	
information	 concerning	 the	 allocation	 of	
resources;	the	(hierarchical)	division	of	 labour	
leads	 to	 economies	 through	 specialisation;	
through	the	centralisation	of	decision-making,	
the	hierarchy	permits	a	diminuation	of	effects	
on	 the	organisation	of	 changes	 in	 the	work	
environment,	etc.	As	we	can	see,	 transaction	
theory	 thus	 deals	 with	 the	 allocation	 of	
resources.	Williamson	discusses	the	efficiency	
(in	comparative	 terms,	between	organisation	
and	market)	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 transaction	
according	 to	 the	nature	of	 the	assets	 to	be	
exchanged	but	 rarely	 raises	 the	 problems	
of	 either	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 resources	 or	
of	 the	distribution	 of	 the	 resulting	profits.	
We	may	ask,	 for	example,	who	appropriates	
the	 organisational	 quasi-rent	within	 this	
theoretical	 framework.	 Insofar	as	Williamson	
treats	 the	 work	 contract--a	 transaction	
involving	 the	 specific	 human	 asset--as	 an	
action	 that	 is	 contractual	 (long	 term)	 but	
basically	 individual,	 the	overall	distribution	
pattern	does	not	 seem	very	different	 from	
that	developped	by	agency	theory.
　Relative	 to	 these	views	of	 the	 'atomistic'	
firm	combining	methodological	 individualism,	
shareholder	sovereignty	and	hierarchical	co-
ordination,	Aoki	 introduces	 a	 new	model	
of	 shareholder-wage-earner	 co-operation	
(Aoki	 1988).	This	model	 is	 intended	 to	 be	
normative,	 or	 even	generalisable,	 although	
it	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 stylised	 facts	 of	 the	
Japanese	 firm.	 Its	 originality	 lies	 in	 the	
emphasis	 placed	 on	 the	 primacy	 of	wage-
earner	 actions	 in	 the	production	 of	wealth.	
Indeed,	 the	 author	 considers	 that	 the	
efficiency	of	 the	organisation	 in	an	uncertain	
world	 increasingly	 depends	 on	 the	wage-
earners'	 collective	 ability	 to	 co-ordinate	
themselves	horizontally	 in	 the	very	acts	 of	
production	as	well	as	 in	 the	 learning	of	 this	
collective	capacity.	 It	 is	 thus	as	 if	 the	wage-
earners	became	a	specific	collective	asset	 to	
the	 firm	 like	 the	 financial	 asset.３	 In	 order	
to	maintain	an	organisational	 equilibrium	 in	
the	firm,	 the	shareholder	 is	 thus	required	to	
accept	the	sharing	of	the	organisational	quasi-
rent	with	 the	wage-earner,	 and	 the	 latter,	
along	with	the	union	representing	his	or	her	
interest,	acquires	an	advantage	allowing	 the	
negotiation	of	not	only	the	remuneration	but	
also	all	the	employment	conditions	influencing	
the	 acquisition	 of	 competences	 and	 a	 real	
influence	on	 the	 firm's	orientations.	At	 first	
sight,	 such	 a	 situation	 of	 negotiation--or	
bargaining--seems	potentially	unstable	 and	
even	conflictual.	But	 the	recent	contribution	
of	the	games	theory,	according	to	Aoki,	shows	
that	 a	 stable	 solution	 for	 the	organisational	
optimum	 can	 exist	 if	management	 -here	
assumed	 to	 be	 neutral 	 and	 impart ia l -	
elaborates	the	firm's	strategies	by	taking	into	
３.	Not	in	the	sense	of	the	specific	(individual)	skill	in	the	context	of	the	theory	of	human	capital.
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consideration	the	locally	optimised	interests	of	
shareholders	and	wage-earners	in	an	equitable	
way.
　These	different	approaches,	based	on	 the	
'contractual'	 paradigm	which	 emphasizes	
both	the	 incomplete	 information	of	the	world	
and	 the	 contractualisation	 of	 bonds	 and	
games	between	agents	 in	order	 to	minimise	
uncertainty,	 stand	 out	 rather	 clearly	 from	
the	 standard	 approach	 privileged	 by	 the	
Neoclassical	 school.	From	this	point	of	view,	
they	renew	the	conceptual	 approach	 to	 the	
firm	 in	an	 interesting	way.	However,	 all	 of	
these	recent	approaches	basically	depend	on	
a	static	model	 that	 is	 ill	equipped	to	analyse	
the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 economic	world.	 In	
the	 following	 section,	we	 shall	 attempt	 to	
reconsider	the	different	currents	of	the	theory	
of	 the	 firm	within	 a	 dynamic	 perspective,	
which	requires	us	to	replace	the	 'contractual'	
paradigm	by	the	 'competence'	paradigm.	We	
shall	 clearly	 privilege	 the	 phenomenon	 of	
innovation,	where	 firms	must	be	considered	
as	 entities	 accumulating	 knowledge	 and	
know-how,	 forging	 their	 competence	 and	
developping	 their	 organisational	 ability	 in	
order	to	move	forward.
II. The firm as producer of competences
　In	a	 review	book,	Cohendet	 and	Llerena	
(1998)	 introduce	 an	 interesting	 distinction	
among	the	different	currents	of	the	theory	of	
the	 firm.	According	 to	 the	authors,	 the	 two	
kinds	of	approaches	 identified	offer	radically	
different	representations	of	the	firm.	
　The	 first	 type	 is	 based	 on	 the	 firm	 as	
'information	 processor'.These	 approaches	
intrinsically	consider	the	firm	as	a	mechanism	
whose	 primary	 goal	 is	 the	 resolution	 of	
problems	of	 information.	This	 is	notably	 the	
case	for	agency	theory	with	the	assymmetry	
of	 information,	 for	 incomplete	 contracts	
theory	with	 the	 impossibility	 of	 knowing	
all	 the	 future	 information,	 or	 for	 Simon's	
organisational	approach	 (1957),	based	on	 the	
notion	of	 the	 individual's	 limited	 rationality,	
which	 supposes	 that	 the	 f irm	 (or	 the	
organisation)	emerges	in	order	to	compensate	
for	the	finite	human	capacity	to	acquire,	store	
and	process	 information.	 In	 addition,	 these	
approaches	 are	 all	 characterised	 by	 their	
analytical	 focus	 on	 the	match	between	 the	
forms	of	 co-ordination	and	 incentives	which	
would	permit	 the	solution	of	 the	 information	
problems	 raised.	As	we	have	already	 seen,	
the	firm	is	considered	here	as	'contract	nexus',	
and	the	theories	of	 the	firm	examined	 in	the	
preceding	section	are	thus	essentially	part	of	
this	first	kind	of	approach.
　In	 contrast	 to	 this	 group	 of	 approaches,	
which	would	deduce	the	firm's	behaviour	from	
the	way	 it	processes	 the	 information	signals	
that	 it	detects	 in	 its	environment,	Cohendet	
cites	the	recent	development	of	an	economic	
literature	 based	 on	 a	 shared	 hypothesis	
that	 'the	 firm's	essential	 attribute	 lies	 in	 its	
organisational	 skills	 or	 capacities'.	 Such	 a	
hypothesis,	with	which	we	are	 in	 complete	
agreement,	thus	leads	us	to	focus	our	analyses	
on	the	creation	of	new	knowledge,	 individual	
and	collective	learning	and	the	construction	of	
the	firm's	organisational	capacities.
　Before	examining	the	'evolutionary'	current	
which	has	gradually	brought	out	a	new	vision	
of	 the	firm	as	trajectory	of	 the	accumulation	
of	 competences	and	which	 seems	 to	be	 the	
most	 fruitful	 in	 the	 recent	 literature	 on	
innovation,	we	 shall	 propose	 a	 rereading	
-different	 from	 the	 one	 developped	 in	 the	
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preceding	section-	of	certain	of	Williamson's	
and	Aoki's	writings.	Indeed,	whilst	these	two	
authors	basically	 remain	within	 the	context	
of	 the	 'information'	or	 'contractual'	paradigm,	
they	advance	an	 interesting	 idea	concerning	
the	 firm's	 'specific	 asset',	which	potentially	
allows	us	to	go	beyond	the	vision	of	the	firm	
as	'information	processor'	or	'contract	nexus'.
A) Specificity of the asset according to Williamson
　In	 a	 neo-institutionalist	 perspective,	
Williamson	 (1975)	 construes	 the	 firm	 in	
contrast	 to	 the	market	by	 introducing	 the	
notion	 of	 transaction	 costs.	He	 deals	with	
the	 efficiency	 (minimisation	 of	 transaction	
costs)	of	 the	 forms	of	exchange	by	crossing	
two	main	 criteria	 which	 determine	 the	
transaction	 situations--the	 specificity	 of	 the	
assets	 in	 place	 (nature	 of	 the	 investment)	
and	the	frequency	of	exchange	relations.	The	
resulting	typology	thus	leads	to	distinguishing	
three	 forms	 of	what	 he	 calls	 'governance'.	
The	market	 is	 the	most	 efficient	 structure	
for	 standard	or	non-specific	assets,	whether	
the	 exchange	 is	 occasional	 or	 repeated.	
Conversely,	the	hierarchical	structure	(notably	
vertical	integration	within	the	organisation)	is	
imperative	 for	assets	requiring	 idiosyncratic	
investments,	which	 are	 those	 unlikely	 to	
have	alternative	uses.	The	third	case	consists	
of	 hybrid	 forms	 of	 control:	 for	 occasional	
exchange	relations,	 the	 recourse	 to	a	 third-
party	 referee	 responsible	 for	 handling	
conflicts	 and	 evaluating	 performances	 is	
the	most	 efficient;	 in	 the	 case	 of	 repeated	
relations,	 the	 control	 is	 carried	 out	 either	
through	 specific	 subcontracting	 (bilateral	
governance)	or	 internally.	 In	 this	model,	 the	
co-ordination	 of	 the	 activity	 is	 determined	
by:	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 products	 are	
standardised,	the	degree	of	necessity	to	invest	
in	specific	skills	and	facilities,	the	frequency	of	
relations,	the	relative	cost	of	transactions	and	
organisation	and	the	level	of	uncertainty.	The	
firm	 is	 thus	defined	by	default	 in	relation	to	
the	market	as	one	of	the	contractual	exchange	
mechanisms	which	minimises	the	transaction	
cost	of	the	specific	assets	by	neutralising	the	
opportunism	of	 the	 agents	 responsible	 for	
them.
　This	 approach	 allows	 us	 to	 go	 beyond	
the	Neoclassical	 representation	 of	 the	 firm	
as	 a	 simple	 production	 function	 by	giving	
it	 the	 co-ordination	 function	 (system	 of	
information	 and	 decision-making,	 control	
and	 linkage	of	activities).	From	this	point	of	
view,	 it	reinforces	the	Neoclassical	paradigm,	
enhances	 the	 allocative	 dimensions	 of	 the	
productive	 factors	 and	 sharply	 extends	 its	
scope	 rather	 than	opposing	 it.	Focusing	on	
cost	 comparison,	 this	 approach	 strikes	 us	
as	 a	 very	 powerful	 tool	 for	 analysing	 the	
boundaries	 of	 the	 organisation	 (the	 firm's	
strategies	 for	 'making	 or	 buying' ) , 	 the	
relations	between	organisations	or	between	
organisation	and	market.
　Nonetheless,	 in	 its	 focus	 on	 exchange,	
it	 tends	 to	neglect	 one	 of	 the	 firm's	major	
reasons	 for	 existing,	 namely	 production,	 a	
complex	activity	which	requires	 the	setting	
up	 of	 technologies	 in	 time,	 the	 process	
of	 technical	 learning	 and	 the	 building	 of	
competences.	The	 idea	 of	 the	 specificity	 of	
assets	 is	probably	useful	 in	 the	attempt	 to	
incorporate	 the	production	 phenomen	 into	
the	corpus	of	transactional	theory.	Williamson	
himself	distinguishes	three	groups	of	specific	
assets:	know-how	 (human	capital	 specificity),	
the	 ordering	 of	 transactions	 (in	 space	 and	
time)	and	the	equipment	or	facilities	required	
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to	 produce	 a	 given	 component	 (dedicated	
specificity).	These	 specific	 assets	 could	 be	
interpreted	as	corresponding	 to	 the	 idea	of	
competences	(in	the	evolutionary	sense	of	the	
term),	which	make	up	the	firm's	dynamic.	 In	
spite	of	such	a	possible	reading,	transactional	
literature	remains	different	from	evolutionary	
literature	 and	 has	 difficulty	 integrating	
production	into	its	own	paradigm.
　-	First	of	all,	the	transaction	costs	approach	
attempts	 to	 compare	 the	various	 forms	 of	
co-ordination	 in	 terms	of	market	 efficiency	
but	 tells	us	nothing	about	 the	difference	 in	
organisational	efficiency	between	firms,	which	
are	 all	 assimilated	 to	 a	 single	 hierarchical	
function.	The	presence	or	absence	of	specific	
assets	does	not	distinguish	 the	 firms	here,	
unlike	the	evolutionary	approach	which,	as	we	
shall	see	later	on,	emphasises	the	fundamental	
role	 of	 competences	 in	 making	 such	 a	
distinction.	The	notion	 of	 specific	 assets	 is	
more	tied	to	the	possibility	of	transaction	than	
the	capacity	for	production.
　-	Second,	 the	defenders	of	 the	 transaction	
literature	 see	 the	 specificity	 of	 assets	 as	 a	
result	rather	than	a	process.	What	counts	for	
understanding	the	productive	activity,	which	
is	by	definition	dynamic,	 is	not	so	much	the	
nature	of	 the	assets	 invested	as	 the	process	
of	 specifying	 the	 assets	 involved.	The	 firm	
generates	 productivity	 gains	 through	 the	
specification	of	 facilities,	machines	and	skills,	
thus	 through	 individual	 and	 organisational	
learning.	The	 (ex-post)	 comparative	analysis	
of	costs	sheds	no	 light	at	all	on	this	 learning	
process,	which	 is	 an	 essential	 element	 of	
innovation.
　 - 	 Th i r d , 	 t h i s 	 a pp r o a ch , 	 b a s e d 	 o n	
methodological	 individualism,	maintains	 a	
vision	of	 the	firm	decomposed	 into	a	myriad	
of	bilateral	 contracts	between	 the	principal	
and	the	agents	holding	the	different	resources.	
It	 thus	 shares	 the	 same	 basic	 conception	
with	 the	agency	 theory,	which	reduces	 the	
problems	of	organisation	 to	 the	problematic	
of	 incentives	 in	a	situation	of	assymmetrical	
access	 to	 information.	This	 atomised	vision	
of	 the	 firm	 keeps	 us	 from	 grasping	 the	
central	 phenomenon	 of	 production,	which	
consists	 of	 the	 complementarity	 of	 assets	
emerging	over	 time.	 In	 fact,	 the	productive	
activity	 relies	 on	a	 complex	combination	of	
different	assets	which	overlap	and	intermingle	
through	multiple	 interactions.	This	kind	of	
complementarity	or	interdependence	between	
the	assets,	which	gives	rise	to	knowledge	that	
is	often	 tacit	or	unconscious,	 structures	 the	
firm's	 capacity	 for	organisation	or,	 in	other	
terms,	 its	 competence.	Transaction	analysis	
does	 not	 seem	 able	 to	 take	 such	 asset-
structuring	effects	into	account.
B) Aoki and firm J: the notion of the specific 
collective asset
　As	 known,	Aoki's	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	
an	 international	 comparison	 of	 theory	 and	
practice.	 The	 comparison	 between	 two	
opposite	 forms	of	organisation	 found	 in	 firm	
J	 (Japanese)	 and	 firm	A	 (American)	 has	
various	 implications	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 the	
firm's	organisational	efficiency	and	the	 issue	
of	 co-ordination/incentive.	Firm	A,	defined	
as	hierarchical,	shows	 itself	 to	be	effective	 in	
either	a	totally	stabilised	environment	or	one	
that	 is	unpredictable,	whilst	 firm	J	 is	more	
efficient	 in	a	changing	environment	because	
its	 decentralised	 information	 structure	
facilitates	its	gradual	adaptation	to	fluctuation.
　Aoki's	 characterisation	 of	 firm	 J	 relative	
to	 firm	A	 (very	 close	 to	 the	 prototype	 of	
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the	Neoclassical	 firm)	 leads	us	 to	 the	 core	
of	 organisational	 innovations	 (just-in-time,	
versatility,	 linearity	 of	manufacturing,	 etc.).	
It	 gives	 pride	 of	 place	 to	 horizontal	 co-
ordination	mechanisms	which	permit	learning	
processes	at	 the	most	decentralised	 levels	of	
organisation.	The	whole	of	these	organisational	
innovations	bring	out	the	originality	of	firm	J	
relative	 to	 the	traditional	hierarchical	model.	
However,	 these	 organisational	 innovations	
as	such	are	not	 the	explicit	object	of	Aoki's	
analysis,	 for	 he	 transforms	 them	 into	 a	
problematic	 of	 information	 flow	 in	 terms	
of	 an	 'information	exchange	 system',	 and	 it	
is	 the	 latter	which	 provides	 the	 basis	 for	
distinguishing	between	the	different	types	of	
firms.	Consistent	with	each	kind	of	firm,	 the	
information	 exchange	 system	regulates	 the	
principle	of	 operation	and	efficiency.	Unlike	
firm	A,	where	 the	 hierarchy	 centralises	
and	monitors	all	 the	 information,	 the	 firm's	
decentralised	 information	system	is	the	basis	
for	 learning	mechanisms	which	 originate	
from	 tacit,	 informal	procedures	 for	 sharing	
information	and	know-how.	This	horizontal	co-
ordination,	moreover,	must	be	coupled	with	a	
particular	system	of	promotion,	the	'hierarchy	
of	ranks'.	This	incentive	scheme	gives	rise	to	
an	emulation	of	competences	and	know-how	
in	multiple	 learning	 experiences	 insofar	 as	
the	attribution	of	ranks	 (promotion)	depends	
explicitly	on	the	development	of	skills.
　Paradoxically,	the	organisational	innovations	
of	production,	which	are	clearly	 localised	 in	
firm	J,	are	not	analysed	as	such.	Generated	by	
a	historical	context	that	is	particular	to	Japan	
and	 thus	 exogenous	 to	 the	 firm,	 they	 are	
simply	crystallised	 into	 information	exchange	
structures.	This	abstraction	of	organisational	
innovations	considerably	weakens	the	 impact	
of	 concepts	 such	 as	 learning,	 co-operation	
or	 competence	 that	Aoki	uses.	Reduced	 to	
a	 problem	 of	 information	 processing,	 co-
operation	is	rather	akin	to	the	communication	
of	horizotal	 information;	 competence,	 to	 the	
ability	 to	process	and	communicate	 signals	
and	 learning,	 to	mutual	 adaptations.	Thus,	
these	 concepts	 do	 not	manage	 either	 to	
take	root	 in	the	depth	of	 the	organisation	or	
to	 constitute	 the	driving	 force	 for	building	
organisational	 capacities	 that	 permit	 the	
firm	 to	 create	 new	knowledge.	 Conscious	
of	 this	 formalism	 and	moving	 away	 from	
methodological	 individualism,	 the	 author	
introduces	 the	notion	 of	 'specific	 collective	
asset'	 to	 designate	 the	 firm's	 overall	 co-
ordinating	skill	which	orients	 its	activities	 in	
relation	 to	 competition	 or	demand.	All	 the	
salaried	players	are	encouraged	to	contribute	
to	building	 it,	 in	exchange	 for	compensatory	
i n c e n t i v e s 	 ( p r omo t i o n , 	 g u a r a n t e e d	
employment,	 etc. ) . 	 Incorporated	 in	 the	
'communications	networks'	which	 the	wage-
earners	 as	 a	whole	 develop	 in	 interaction,	
this	asset,	specific,	intangible	and	unalienable,	
structures	 the	 firm's	 co-ordinating	capacity,	
which	is	decisive	in	determining	its	efficiency	
and	as	a	result	constitutes	 the	source	of	 the	
'organisational	income'	which	the	firm	obtains	
from	market	co-ordination.
　The	use	 of	 such	a	 concept	 is	 interesting	
insofar	as	 it	 allows	 the	whole	of	 the	know-
how	spread	 throughout	 the	organisation	 to	
be	 collectivised	 and	 the	 idiosyncratic	 and	
non-exchangeable	nature	 of	 each	 firm's	 co-
ordinating	 capacity	 to	 be	 identified.	 But	
whilst	the	concept	of	'specific	collective	asset'	
represents	 an	 effort	 of	 theorisation	 aimed	
at	 grasping	 the	 firm's	 capacity,	 it	 remains	
static	 from	the	standpoint	of	 the	creation	of	
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resources,	notably	human	resources.	Prisoner	
of	an	information-based	view	of	the	firm,	Aoki	
does	not	 seem	able	 to	 conceive	of	 learning	
other	 than	 as	 a	process	 of	 adapting	 to	 the	
changing	 environment.	 Such	 a	 conception	
seems	 too	 restrictive,	 if	 not	 passive,	 and	
prevents	any	real	analysis	of	innovation.
C) Evolutionary approach: the firm based on the 
notion of competences
　There	 is	no	doubt	 that	 the	conception	of	
the	firm	as	the	trajectory	of	the	accumulation	
of	 competences	 has	 been	 outl ined	 and	
consolidated	by	evolutionary	thought	(Penrose	
1958).	 Relying	mainly	 on	 this	 evolutionary	
approach,	we	 shall	 try	 to	 suggest	 a	 few	
angles	of	research	on	the	firm's	organisational	
capacities.
　The	 first	 evolutionary	 theory	of	 the	 firm	
was	mainly	developped	by	Nelson	and	Winter	
(1982),	 who	 formulated	 four	 criticisms	 of	
orthodox	 theory:	 its	 inability	 to	view	of	 the	
firm	other	than	as	an	individual	entrepreneur,	
its	inability	to	understand	why	firms	exist,	its	
lack	of	a	foothold	in	real	economic	phenomena	
and	its	simplistic	notion	of	what	is	covered	by	
the	 term	 technology,	which	 is	presented	as	
exogenous	and	given.
　On	the	basis	of	these	observed	weaknesses,	
Nelson	 and	Winter	 develop	 an	 alternative	
model	 that	 is	better	adapted	to	 the	analysis	
of	 change.	 One	 of	 the	 new	 hypotheses	
underlying	 this	model	 concerns	 the	nature	
of	 competition	between	 firms,	now	seen	as	
a	phenomen	sharply	marked	by	uncertainty	
or	 accidental	 events	 and	 also	 affected	 by	
the	 firms'	 singular,	 specific	 trajectories	and	
knowledge.	 Such	 an	 approach	 permits	 us	
to	 escape	an	overly	 substantialist	vision	of	
the	 firm	conceived	as	having	certain	given	
capacities	 in	 favour	of	a	dynamic	vision	that	
places	 the	 emphasis	 on	 learning	processes	
serving	to	build	these	capacities.	
　This	reinterpretation	greatly	enriches	 the	
concept	of	technology:
　First	of	all,	 technology	 is	no	 longer	 limited	
to	a	technical	facility,	a	capital	investment,	but	
also	presumes	the	activation	of	competences	
and	 knowledge	 capable	 of	 conceiving	 and	
integrating	 these	 facilities	 and	making	
them	 function.	Technology	 is	no	 longer	 an	
exogenous	constraint	but	 a	 capacity	at	 the	
very	heart	of	the	firm's	operation.
　Second,	 technology	 is	 apprehended	 in	
a	 dynamic	 perspective	 directly	 related	 to	
the	 phenomenon	 of	 innovation.	Thus,	 the	
innovation	process	constitutes	a	central	factor	
of	efficiency	permitting	the	firm's	capacities	to	
be	developped	and	adapted	to	a	changing	and	
partly	unpredictable	environment.	 Innovation	
is	 the	 product	 of	 an	 adaptation	 dynamic	
closely	 linked	 to	 the	 firm's	 organisational	
dynamic.	Similarly,	 it	 results	 from	a	process	
of	 successive	decisions	 that	 is	 itself	marked	
by	procedures	codified	by	past	experiences.	
The	capacities	are	thus	 fundamentally	based	
on	cognitive	 factors	related	 to	 the	way	that	
the	firm's	different	players	and	their	collective	
organisat ion	 produce	 and	 appropriate	
production	know-how,	which	leads	to	a	vision	
of	the	firm	as	keeper	of	a	store	of	competence	
and	complementary	assets	 (Teece	1998),	 or	
what	 certain	 cognitive	 scientists	 call	 the	
'depository	 of	 memories,	 know-how	 and	
knowledge'	.	
　This	kind	of	evolutionary	approach	presents	
certain	major	 advantages	 relative	 to	 the	
classical	 literature.	First,	 it	 takes	 innovation	
into	account	as	an	essential	factor	of	efficiency,	
an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 firm's	 operations,	
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whilst	 the	 'information'	 theories	previously	
presented	do	not	deal	with	 this.	 In	addition,	
it	 conceives	of	 innovation	as	an	endogenous	
phenomenon	linked	to	the	cognitive	capacities	
(competences,	 knowledge	 and	 techniques)	
which	structure	the	firm.	Finally,	 it	develops	
a	 'systemic'	 approach,	where	 innovation,	
production	 and	 the	 market	 are	 closely	
interconnected.	 Innovation	does	not	 evolve	
solely	according	to	a	predetermined	technical	
logic	 but	 also	 depends	 on	 the	market	 or,	
more	broadly,	on	 interdependences	between	
designers	and	users,	and	so	on.
　The	 central 	 quest ion	 that	 ar ises	 in	
such	 a	 perspective	 is	 thus	 the	 dynamics	
of	 the	 knowledge	 underlying	 the	 firm's	
performances.	 Posit ing	 that	 the	 f irm's	
capacities	rely	on	knowledge	and	competences	
naturally	leads	to	conceiving	of	the	firm	as	a	
'depository	of	 specific	productive	knowledge	
accumulated	over	 time'.	Thus,	each	firm	can	
be	characterised	by	 its	cognitive	 trajectory,	
which	closely	depends	on	prior	competences	
and	knowledge,	successive	adaptations	to	the	
environment	or	even	accidents	along	the	way:	
"The	new	 is	not	 just	better	 than	 the	old;	 in	
some	senses	it	evolves	out	of	the	old"	(Nelson	
1995).	This	 trajectory	 is	what	 creates	 the	
differences	 from	one	 sector	 to	 another	and	
the	variety	 amongst	 firms.	For	Nelson	and	
Winter,	each	firm	 is	 thus	singular	 insofar	as	
its	history	crystallises	in	specific	know-how.
　A	 related	question	 thus	 emerges:	 if	 the	
firm	 constitutes	 a	 fund	 of	 resources	 or	
competences,	 where	 is	 this	 productive	
knowledge	stored?	In	the	Neoclassical	models,	
technological	 knowledge	 corresponds	 only	
to	 formalised	knowledge	which	 is	 classified	
and	 	stored	 in	 tangible	 forms	such	as	plans,	
formulas,	expert	systems	or	teaching	manuals.	
They	ignore	or	underestimate	the	role	of	the	
knowledge	and	know-how	that	remain	 tacit,	
unformalised,	 unconscious	 or	 interpersonal	
and	which,	 according	 to	 the	 evolutionary	
authors,	decisively	determine	 the	efficiency	
of	 the	 technologies	 to	be	 implemented.	To	
be	 sure,	 the	whole	 of	 this	 tacit	 knowledge	
is	 often	 incorporated	 in	 the	 skil ls	 and	
qualifications	borne	by	 the	 individuals.	But	
for	 the	evolutionists,	organisation	 is	primary	
in	 the	 function	 of	 creating	 and	preserving	
tacit	 knowledge	 and	know-how.	The	 firms	
have	 a	memory,	 or	 rather,	 procedures	 for	
memorising	 experiences,	which	 last	 longer	
than	the	human	limit	of	these	individuals.	The	
firm's	 cognitive	dimension	goes	beyond	 the	
level	of	 the	 individual	 to	 the	collective	 level	
within	the	firm	itself,	which	makes	it	necesary	
to	consider	 the	nature	of	 this	organisational	
knowledge	as	well	as	the	way	it	is	distributed	
and	revised.
　Innovation	 is	 a	 privileged	 	 locus	 for	 the	
creation	of	new	competences	which	will	be	
used,	distributed	and	developped	 in	 function	
of	 the	 form	 taken	 by	 the	 organisation	 of	
labour.	A	large	part	of	the	firm's	capacities	are	
located	at	the	organisational	level	in	the	form	
of	 routines	which	partly	 impose	 themselves	
on	 the	 firm's	players.	From	this	 standpoint,	
the	evolutionists	emphasise	the	importance	of	
organisational	memory,	which	may	be	defined	
as	a	group	of	rules	and	procedures	 inscribed	
in	objects,	in	competences	or	in	the	linkage	of	
the	players.
　The	firm's	competences	emerge	and	evolve	
in	function	of	three	main	mechanisms:
　The	 f irst	 involves	 routinisation,	 the	
construction	 of	 rules	 of	 behaviour	 that	
allow	the	firm	to	 'do	things	with	confidence'.	
Routines	are	 the	 fruit	of	conflictual	relations	
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within	 the	organisation	which	give	rise	 to	a	
form	of	consensus.	They	stabilise	compromise	
and	determine	the	rules	of	the	game	to	which	
the	players	are	subject	and	are	thus	basically	
conservative	in	nature.
　The	 second	 i s 	 the 	 amnes ia 	 t i ed	 to	
the	 disappearance	 of	 certain	 little-used	
competences.	This	mechanism	of	 selection	
serves	 as	 a	 filtre	 to	 constitute	 and	 adapt	
the	 firm's	 'core	competence'	 (Teece	1998)	 in	
function	of	modifications	in	the	environment.
　The	 third	mechanism	goes	 back	 to	 the	
innovation	 that	 takes	 place	 through	 the	
acquisition	of	new	comptences.	All	innovation	
is	 potentially	 able	 to	 disrupt	 established	
routines	 and	 thus	 to	 modify	 the	 firm's	
capacities	because	its	introduction	necessitates	
the	adaptation	or	reconfiguration	of	existing	
routines.	Whatever	 its	 nature,	 innovation	
leads	 to	organisational	 transformation,	which	
very	 often	 depends	 nonetheless	 on	 new	
combinations	of	existing	routines	(Nelson	and	
Winter	1982).
　These	 three	 apparently	 contradictory	
mechanisms	 constitute	 the	 framework	 for	
the	 evolutionists'	 problematic	 of	 change.	
Nelson	and	Winter's	central	thesis	on	change	
is	paradoxically	based	on	the	stabilising	role	
of	 routines.	Firms	 function	by	establishing	
rou t ines , 	 wh ich 	 cons t i tu te 	 po in t s 	 o f	
reference	 for	 the	activity.	The	 imitation	and	
reproduction	of	 the	routines	plays	 the	same	
reproductive	 role	 in	 the	 firms	 as	genes	 in	
biology.	Through	 their	 automatic,	 regular	
nature,	these	routines	permit	the	accumulation	
of	 specific,	 partially	 tacit	 technological	
knowledge	within	 the	 organisation,	which	
constitutes	the	fund	of	competences.	But	they	
also	permit	rapid	decision	making,	anticipation	
of	the	activities	of	others	or	the	establishment	
of	 rules	 for	 co-ordination.	The	evolutionary	
authors	 stress	 that	 the	complexity	of	 tasks	
encourages	 the	 establishment	 of	 routines,	
the	creation	of	norms	and	responses	socially	
constructed	in	the	form	of	norms.	We	can	see	
the	extent	to	which	these	routines	constitute	
a	factor	of	co-ordination	between	the	members	
of	 the	firm	and	thus	of	 its	performance.	The	
key	 issue	 for	 the	 firm	 is	 thus	 the	 selection	
and	dissemination	of	 efficient	 routines.	The	
basic	 nature	 of	 the	 routines,	 furthermore,	
is	marked	by	 a	 resistance	 to	 change.	The	
first	reason	 for	 this,	which	 is	cognitive,	goes	
back	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 co-ordinating	an	
organisation,	 notably	 because	 of	 the	 tacit	
knowledge	 that	 the	 activities	 imply.	This	
complexity	of	co-ordination	tends	to	preserve	
existing	 procedures	 in	 order	 to	maintain	
coherence	 through	mechanisms	 of	 control.	
These	elements	go	beyond	 the	capacities	of	
one	 individual	 and	belong	 to	 the	 collective	
dynamic.	The	 second	 reason	 is	 related	 to	
the	conflictual	nature	of	 the	 life	of	 the	 firm.	
It	 is	difficult,	 and	above	all	 costly,	 to	obtain	
a	compromise	amongst	 the	players,	 each	of	
whom	has	chosen	his	or	her	own	rationality.	
Once	elaborated,	however,	such	a	compromise	
tends	 to	become	a	part	of	 the	 routines	and	
the	 coherence	 of	 the	 routines	 amongst	
themselves.
　At	the	same	time,	and	quite	paradoxically,	
the	firm	needs	to	make	its	routines	evolve	in	
function	of	the	new	market	and	technological	
prospects.	 Since	 the	 environment,	 	 notably	
conditions	 of	 competition,	 is	 changing,	 it	
has	 to	 create	new	knowledge	 internally	 or	
adopt	 outside	 knowledge	 that	 allows	 it	 to	
preserve	 its	competitive	advantage.	 It	must	
continuously	 replenish	 its	 competences	 in	
order	 to	be	 able	 to	perceive	 and	 seize	 the	
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new	opportunities	that	present	themselves.
　In	 the	 evolutionary	view,	 	 the	notion	 of	
the	 firm's	 organisational	 capacities	 is	 thus	
subject	 to	 a	 permanent	 tension	 between	
the	preservation	of	 the	routines	which	build	
their	competences,	order	 them	and	maintain	
them	a	 coherent	whole	 and	 the	 search	 for	
new	 routines	 which	 generate	 their	 own	
renewal.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 operation	 of	
the	 firm	results	 from	a	repeated	movement	
bertween	 innovation	 and	normalisation	 or	
irreversibility	 and	 reversibility.	The	 firm	
thus	appears	not	only	as	a	structure	 for	 the	
management	 and	 accumulation	 of	 specific	
competences	 but	 as	 an	 entity	 endowed	 at	
once	with	rules	of	operation	which	summarise	
past	 collective	 learning	 experiences	 and	
rules	 of	 development	which	 authorise	 the	
acquisition	of	new	knowledge.	As	Dosi	 and	
Metcalfe	 (1991)	emphasise,	 "The	crucial	rules	
are	those	used	by	an	organisation	in	order	to	
perceive	 its	own	environment	and	those	that	
it	implements	in	order	to	learn	how	to	learn".
D) Limits of the evolutionary approach
　The	 contribution	 of	 the	 evolutionary	
approach	proves	to	be	very	significant	in	the	
revival	of	the	theory	of	the	firm.	The	different	
authors	advocating	this	approach	have	offered	
convincing	explanations	 for	a	 large	series	of	
questions	 that	have	often	gone	unanswered	
in	 Neoclassical	 l iterature.	 Indeed,	 this	
approach,	based	on	notions	of	 competences,	
routines	and	 learning	experiences,	 suggests	
interesting	possibilities	 for	 explaining	 in	 a	
relatively	coherent	way	how	 firms	come	 to	
exist,	 	why	they	differ	and	how	they	evolve.	
Notwithstanding	 this	 considerable	 effort	 at	
the	theoretical	level,	however,	it	remains	true	
that	 the	analyses	of	 the	dynamic	dimension	
of	 the	 firm	 are	 still	 largely	 incomplete.	 In	
the	 remarks	 that	 follow,	we	 shall	 attempt	
to	 address	 several	 points	 which	 seem	
problematic	to	us.
　The	 first	 of	 these	 relates	 to	 the	 central	
concept	 of	 routines,	 the	 "firm's	 veritable	
biological	 genes	which	may	be	 assimilated	
to	repetitive	activity	programmes	or	models	
ensur ing	 the	 l ink	 between	 indiv idual	
behaviours	and	their	predictability"	(Cohendet	
and	 llerena	 1998).	We	 are	 certainly	 not	
calling	 into	question	 the	 analytical	 interest	
of	 this	 notion,	 but	 it	 seems	worthwhile	
to	 discuss	 the	mechanisms	which	 in	 fact	
articulate	 the	 local	 and	global	 levels	 of	 the	
firm.	The	nature	of	routines	as	described	 in	
the	 evolutionary	 studies	 seems	 extremely	
disparate	 and	 situated	 at	 different	 levels:	
they	range	 from	 'strategic'	 routine	 (e.g.,	 the	
procedure	determining	the	decision	to	launch	
a	 new	product),	 or	 the	 habitus	 routine	 as	
corporate	culture,	 to	 the	 'operational'	 routine	
(the	 operator's	 know-how	 in	 the	 control	
room),	not	 to	mention	 the	 'cognitive'	 routine	
(the	organisational	 filtre	 that	determines	the	
perception	 of	 the	market)	 and	 so	 on.	 Such	
heterogeneity	 is	 not	 in	 itself	 disturbing,	
but	what	 remains	unclear	 is	 the	way	 that	
these	different	orders	are	articulated	within	
the	 organisation.	 Certain	 authors	 evoke	 a	
'hierarchy	of	practical	organisational	routines'	
which	would	define	not	only	 the	content	of	
organisational	 skills	 (the	know-how	required	
at	the	most	decentralised	levels)	and	the	way	
they	are	co-ordinated	but	also	the	upper-level	
procedures	to	decide	what	should	be	done	at	
the	lower	levels.	Such	a	vision	of	hierarchical	
articulation	 clearly	has	 the	merit	 of	giving	
the	firm	stability	and	coherence.	Nonetheless,	
the	problem	of	 the	 coherence	 of	 the	whole	
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seems	to	be	a	trap,	for	there	is	no	proof	that	
the	links	between	local	and	global	procedures	
are	so	consistent.	The	compatibility	between	
different	routines	is	probably	not	automatically	
ensured,	 especially	 if	 the	 local	 level	 is	
assumed	to	have	the	autonomous	capacity	for	
learning	new	routines.	This	 situation	raises	
the	possibility	of	the	coexistence	of	conflictual	
if	 not	 incompatible	 routines,	which	 in	 turn	
creates	 dysfunctions	 in	 the	 organisation.	
Likewise,	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 adoption	 of	
new	 routines	 occurs	 solely	 on	 the	basis	 of	
functional	and	efficiency	criteria	 is	debatable.	
It	is	highly	likely	that	certain	locally	adopted	
routines	can	be	poorly	adapted	to	their	tasks	
or	 little	compatible	with	the	 'higher'	or	more	
global	 ones.	Even	 if	 these	 routines	 do	not	
constitute	the	best	solutions	to	the	problems	
raised,	 once	 they	are	adopted	and	put	 into	
regular	practice,	they	tend	to	take	root	in	the	
organisation	by	 the	very	effects	of	 'learning	
by	doing'.	These	two	situations	thus	raise	the	
problem	of	 the	under-optimisation	 (sustained	
or	 structural)	 of	 selected	 routines,	which	
would	 suggest	 that	 the	 firm	 is	basically	on	
the	way	to	disequilibrium.
　The	 second	point,	 closely	 related	 to	 the	
first,	 deals	with	 the	nature	 of	 the	 learning	
experience	 through	which	 knowledge	 and	
know-how	 are	 crystallised	 into	 routines.	
The	 evolutionists	make	 a	 clear	 distinction	
between	 the	 two	 levels	 of	 learning,	which	
go	 back	 to	 the	 individual	 and	 collective	
or	 organisational	 level.	 Collective	 learning	
cannot	thus	be	reduced	to	 the	production	of	
a	 collective	knowledge	directly	attributable	
to	 the	 organisation.	The	 essential	 problem	
here	is	to	understand	how	individual	learning	
is	 transformed	 into	collective	 learning,	with	
the	 understanding	 that	 this	 evolutionary	
approach	 insists	more	 particularly	 on	 the	
representation	 of	 the	 firm	as	 "a	 system	of	
pooling	 	 of	 competences	 and	 creation	 of	
collective	 competences".	On	 this	 point,	 the	
work	of	the	evolutionists	reveal	three	kinds	of	
weaknesses.
　-	First,	although	they	affirm	the	importance	
of	the	intrinsic	value	of	individual	comptences,	
the	process	of	acquiring	 these	competences	
is	described	 in	a	 rather	 	 rudimentary	way.	
Indeed,	the	main	learning	mechanism	consists	
of	 imitating	 experienced	 colleagues	 on	 the	
job	 and	 reproducing	 gestures	 or	 habits,	
since	 a	 large	majority	 of	 the	knowledge	 is	
tacit.	The	 learning	 experience,	 assimilated	
to	 the	 acquisition	 of	 bodily	 and	mental	
habits	 by	 repetition,	 is	 considered	here	 as	
the	 acculturation	 to	 the	 organisation	 or	
the	 gradual	 appropriation	 of	 pre-existing	
knowledge.	This	pattern	corresponds	well	 to	
the	typical	path	of	employees	who	climb	the	
job	hierarchy,	relatively	frozen	because	of	the	
Fordist	work	system,	 in	 the	 internal	market	
(Doeringer	 and	Piore	 1972).	This	 relatively	
static	view	of	individual	learning	seems	poorly	
adapted	to	the	evolutionists'	dynamic	vision	of	
the	firm.
　-	Second,	 this	 approach,	which	privileges	
collective	 learning,	 has	 not	 	 theoretically	
developped	 or	 incorporated	 incent ive	
mechanisms.	It	is	thus	difficult	to	understand	
how	the	 individual	 is	actually	encouraged	to	
improve	his	or	her	own	competences	apart	
from	extreme	cases:	 the	 individual	 engages	
in	the	learning	process	because	the	corporate	
culture	makes	all	 the	 individuals	conform	 in	
this	way,	 or	peer	group	pressure	 sanctions	
and	 controls	 all	 the	 deviant	 individual	
behaviours.	In	addition,	it	may	be	asked	what	
interest	 there	 is	 in	 teaching	 others	 or	 co-
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operating	with	them	if	the	co-operation	is	not	
rewarded	 in	 one	way	or	 another.	Here	 the	
exchange	takes	place	 in	a	 'motivational	void'.	
As	Aoki	insists,	the	acquisition,	transformation	
and	transmission	of	knowledge	 is	essentially	
based	on	 'individual	 acts	 correctly	 inserted	
into	incentive	mechanisms'	(Aoki	1992).
　-	 Final ly , 	 we	 may	 consider ,	 l ike	 the	
evolutionists,	 that	 individuals	 are	 not	 the	
exclusive	guardians	of	 the	 firm's	capacities.	
The	firm	has	a	memory,	or	rather,	procedures	
for	 memorising	 experiences	 which	 are	
prolonged	beyond	 the	human	 limit	of	 these	
individuals.	 Individual	competences	thus	only	
exist	because	 they	 are	 regularly	used	 in	 a	
precise	organisational	context.	In	other	terms,	
the	competences	are	not	 tied	 to	an	 intrinsic	
quality	 of	 the	 individuals	 but	 to	 all	 of	 the	
organisational	elements	surrounding	them:	the	
investment	made	 in	 them,	 the	nature	of	 the	
qualification	that	the	organisation	transmits	to	
them,	their	place	in	the	division	of	labour,	the	
system	of	recognition	and	so	on.	However,	the	
evolutionary	demonstration	of	 the	collective	
construction	of	competences	appears	rather	
weak	 in	 its	 empirical	 dimensions	 and	does	
not	 seem	 to	 go	 beyond	 a	 great	 deal	 of	
generality:	 Argyris	 and	 Schon's	 outline	
based	on	'encoding	of	memory'	and	'cognitive	
maps'	 is	generally	 invoked	 to	 support	 their	
thesis.	 Thus,	 they	 do	 not	 deduce	 all	 the	
consequences	 of	 their	 intuition,	 especially	
those	 relating	 the	 the	 sociological	 density	
of	 the	organisation.	 Indeed,	 as	 certain--non-
substantialist--sociological	research	has	already	
shown,	 competences	are	 forged	as	 a	 'social	
construct'	not	only	 through	 the	constitution	
of	 'common	 knowledge'	 during	 cognitive	
interactions	between	the	agents	but	also	and	
above	all	through	the	process	of	 'socialisation	
of	 the	players'.	The	cognitive	dimensions	are	
thus	 intimately	 embedded	 in	 the	 social	 or	
indeed	societal	dimensions	where	the	building	
of	 individual	 and	 collective	 competences	 is	
concerned.	 In	order	 to	 fully	understand	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 competences	 that	 ultimately	
define	the	firm's	capacities,	 it	 is	necessary	to	
integrate	into	the	analysis,	beyond	the	sectoral	
and	 technological	context	which	determines	
the	field	of	possibilities,	not	only	the	particular	
organisational	context	of	the	firm	(hierarchical	
relations,	forms	of	control,	nature	of	authority,	
rules	of	co-ordination,	 forms	of	circulation	of	
information,	system	of	incentives,	etc.)	but	also	
the	more	general	 social	 context,	 and	more	
precisely,	 the	 interdependences	between	the	
firm	and	the	social	context.	The	 latest	round	
of	evolutionary	studies	addressing	the	notion	
of	 'national	 innovation	 systems'	 probably	
corresponds	to	this	kind	of	approach.
　The	 third	 point	 concerns	 the	 	way	 the	
notion	of	 'generic	 resources'	 is	 treated.	The	
work	 of	Gaffard	 (1993),	which	 emphasises	
the	 economy	of	 creating	 specific	 resources	
(accompanying	 the	process	 of	 technological	
innovation),	 by	 contrast	 to	 Neoclassical	
economics	 based	 on	 the	 a l locat ion	 o f	
production	 factors,	 is,	 from	a	 certain	point	
of	view,	close	 to	 the	evolutionary	approach.	
Thus,	both	of	them	use	the	notion	of	'generic	
resources'	as	one	of	 the	 inputs	that	 the	firm	
absorbs	 from	 the	 exterior	 and	 transforms	
internally	 in	order	to	obtain	the	final	output.	
The	 theoretical	 status	of	 'generic	 resources'	
seems	 important	 since	 they	 symbolise	
the	 subject	 of	 the	 transaction	 that	 the	
firm	 realises	with	 its	 environment.	 In	 the	
minds	 of	many	 authors,	 generic	 resources	
seem	 to	 reflect	 resources	 in	 the	 raw	state,	
unworked	or	simply	 'preformatted'.	However,	
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this	 conception	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 a	 bit	 too	
'naturalistic':	 for	 example,	 generic	 human	
resources	do	not	exist	anywhere	as	'naturally	
given',	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 are	 very	
actively	 reworked	by	 the	 institutions	 even	
before	 they	 appear	 on	 the	 labour	market.	
To	be	 sure,	 they	are	 the	object	 of	 	private	
and	social	 investment	as	human	capital,	but	
above	 all	 they	are	 'certified'	 or	 'formalised'	
in	 institutional	 relations	 that	 appear	 very	
different	 from	 one	 country	 to	 another.	 In	
this	 sense,	 engineers,	who	 are	 one	 of	 the	
driving	forces	of	 innovation,	never	constitute	
a	 universal	 category	 of	 generic	 resources	
(Lanciano,	Maurice,	Nohara	 and	 Silvestre	
1998).	The	notion	of	generic	 resources	must	
thus	be	grasped	more	as	a	 'social	construct'	
that	 emerges	 in	 a	 recurring	 relationship	
between	 institutions,	which	permits	 the	firm	
to	be	analysed	as	an	entity	embedded	 in	a	
group	of	institutions	within	the	society.
　
Ⅲ Contribution of ‘societal approach’
　All	firms	are	part	of	a	greater	whole.	The	
size,	 structure	and	 functioning	of	 firms	are	
not	 independent	variables.	The	first	analyses	
of	 these	 links	 between	 firms	 and	 their	
environment	 are	 the	 famous	 internal	 and	
external	 economies	 of	Alfred	Marshall,	 the	
basis	of	 the	 increasing	returns	to	scale	 in	an	
industry,	which	are	themselves	derived	 from	
Adam	Smith's	principle	 that	 the	division	of	
labour	is	limited	by	market	size.
　The	 division	 of	 labour	 operates	 both	
within	 the	 firm	and	 in	 the	 industry,	where	
it	manifests	 itself	 in	 the	 tendency	 towards	
specialisa	tion.	
　For	Stigler	 (1968),	 vertical	 and	horizontal	
integration,	which	run	counter	 to	 the	 trend	
towards	 specialisation,	 can	 be	 explained	
either	 directly	 by	 inadequate	market	 size	
or	by	attacks	on	competition	 in	 the	market.	
In	place	of	an	analysis	of	 the	 firm	based	on	
the	production	 function	alone,	he	 advances	
a	 notion	 of	 the	 firm	 as	 a	 combination	 of	
separate	functions,	each	of	which	has	its	own	
law	of	 return.	 In	 this	way,	Stigler	 seeks	 to	
demonstrate	the	tendency	towards	integration	
in	new	 industries,	 towards	 the	 splitting-up	
of	 firms	 in	mature	 industries	 and	 towards	
renewed	integration	in	declining	industries.	
　In	 the	 first	 chapter	 of	 ‘Markets	 and	
Hierarchies ’ , 	 Wil l iamson	 discusses	 the	
tendency	 towards	 integration	 that	 Stigler	
explains	 in	 terms	of	 the	 inadequacy	of	 the	
volume	 of	 production	 in	 a	 given	 industry	
("at	 a	 given	 time,	 these	 functions	may	 be	
too	 small	 to	 support	 a	 specialized	 firm	 or	
firms")	 (Williamson	 1975).	 For	Williamson,	
the	obstacle	 to	 this	 rational	 solution	comes	
from	transaction	cost	problems,	namely	 the	
concentration	 of	 information	 in	 the	 firm	
producing	 the	good	 and	uncertainty	 about	
the	 future:	 "given	 opportunism,	 incomplete	
long	term	contracts	predictably	pose	interest	
conflicts	 between	 the	 parties. . .	Without	
present	 or	prospective	 transactions	 costs...	
specialisation	by	 one	 of	 the	 firms...	 to	 the	
benefit	 of	 all,	 would	 presumably	 occur...	
Technology	 is	 no	 bar	 to	 contracting,	 it	 is	
transactional	considerations	that	are	decisive	
"(Williamson	1975).
　Taking	as	our	 starting	point	 the	 surveys	
conducted	 in	 the	machine-tool	 industries	 in	
France,	Germany	and	Japan,	we	would	 like	
to	 show	 that	 specialisation	and	diversity	of	
activity	depend	on	 the	 type	 of	 articulation	
between	firms	and	organisations	 in	what	we	
have	called	their	industrial	space,	which	might	
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be	defined	as	the	whole	set	of	complementary	
and	 therefore	 interdependent	 relationships	
between	 firms	 and	 these	 organisations,	
including	factor	and	product	markets.
	
A) The firm-client linkage
　The	most	 obvious	 of	 these	 links	 is	 that	
created	by	the	market	 itself,	 the	relationship	
with	 customers.	 In	 a	market	 analysis,	 it	 is	
given	 theoretical	 expression	 in	 the	 firm's	
demand	curve,	the	relationship	between	price	
and	quantity	 for	a	differentiated	product.	 In	
the	case	of	the	machine-tool	 industry	studied	
in	the	above-mentioned	surveys,	this	demand	
comes	 from	 the	needs	and	 requirements	of	
industrial	 users.	The	French	machine-tool	
industry	adapted	to	this	demand	and	oriented	
its	output	 towards,	on	the	one	hand,	African	
and	Eastern	countries,	where	 low	skill	 levels	
in	 the	 labour	 force	made	 it	 necessary	 to	
produce	machines	that	were	easy	to	operate	
and,	on	the	other,	towards	protected	national	
markets,	 such	 as	 the	 aeronautics,	motor	
and	defence	 industries.	This	 is	why	French	
machine	tool	manufacturers	specialise	in	both	
simple	and	 top-of-the-range	machines,	 albeit	
with	 small	 production	 runs	 in	 both	 cases.	
This	 adaptation	 to	 the	needs	 of	 particular	
users	also	reflected	the	 low	market	share	of	
the	French	mechanical	engineering	 industry,	
compared	 with	 Germany.	 In	 this	 latter	
country,	 the	machine-tool	 industry,	by	virtue	
of	 the	 size	 of	 the	mechanical	 engineering	
industry	as	a	whole,	not	only	had	a	market	
that	was	 twice	 as	 big	 but	 also	 exported	
throughout	 the	world.	The	expansion	of	 the	
market	gave	rise	to	both	diversity	 (presence	
in	all	markets,	 selling	all	 types	of	machines)	
and	to	specialisation:	each	producer	specialises	
in	certain	 types	of	machines	 (lathes,	milling	
machines,	drilling	machines	etc.),	while	most	
French	 firms	produced	 smaller	 quantities,	
often	of	 several	different	 types	of	machines	
adapted	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 each	 customer	
(Maurice	and	Sorge		1989).
B) The linkage between craft production and 
industrialisation
　One	 characteristic	 of	 the	machine-tool	
industry	in	all	countries	is	its	strong	artisanal	
tradition,	 certain	elements	of	which	are	still	
evident.	They	 include	a	high	share	of	skilled	
workers	and	engineers,	the	importance	of	the	
relationship	between	design	and	production,	
the	 small	 size	 of	 firms,	 many	 of	 which	
are	 family	 owned,	 small	 or	medium-sized	
production	 runs	and	a	gradualist	 approach	
to	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	 technologies	
(hydraulic,	 pneumatic,	 electrical,	 electronic)	
based	on	internal	adaptation	rather	than	once-
and-for-all	breaks	with	the	past.	This	approach	
to	new	technologies	 is	not	unconnected	with	
the	 generally	 high	 skill	 levels.	How,	 from	
its	artisanal	base,	did	 the	 industry	evolve	 in	
each	country?	 In	Germany,	production	runs	
are	 larger	 and	 the	 industrialisation	 of	both	
product	 and	 production	 process	 is	more	
pronounced.	This	accords	with	the	principles	
of	 economic	 theory	 on	 the	 relationship	
between	 size	 of	market,	 specialisation	 and	
industrialisation.	However,	what	is	revealed	by	
societal	analysis	is	that	the	size	of	the	market	
(the	external	market	was,	 after	all,	 open	 to	
French	producers	 as	well)	was	determined	
in	France	by	 the	national	 industrial	 space,	
by	 the	demand	 for	 a	 core	 of	 large	 and,	 in	
particular,	 state-owned	 firms,	 operating	
in	 a	 protected	market	with	well-defined	
characteristics;	 as	 a	 result,	 the	machine-
tool	 industry	 tended	 to	become	entrapped	
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in	 the	manufacture	 of	 specialist	machines,	
produced	 in	 small	 runs	 and	 compatible,	 if	
not	with	 artisanal	 structures,	 then	at	 least	
with	 small	 firms.	 This	 characteristically	
French	form	of	articulation	between	artisanal	
production	and	 industrialisation	popularised	
the	 notion	 of	 fi l ière	 ( l iterally	‘web’)	
which,	 in	 its	accepted	meaning,	refers	to	the	
privileged	exchanges	between	 industries	or	
groups	of	 industries	and	to	the	technological	
complementarities	that	reflect	the	constraints	
of	a	particular	production	process:	"The	notion	
of	filière	emerged	…	as	an	economic	category	
supplementing	 that	of	 industry".	One	might	
talk,	 for	 example,	 of	 the	 electrotechnical	
filière	 (Tolendano	 1978).	 It	 clearly	 reveals	
the	nature	of	 the	 industrial	 space	 in	which	
French	machine-tool	manufacturers	operate.	
The	French	machine-tool	 industry	 functions	
in	a	manner	close	to	monopolistic	competition,	
with	 each	 firm	 surviving	 by	 producing	 a	
differentiated	 product,	 adapted	 to	meet	 a	
specific	demand,	and	depending	 for	 its	very	
existence	on	 the	user	 firm	not	 finding	more	
advantageous	substitutes.
　The	situation	 is	completely	different	when	
the	producer	firm	is	confronted	with	a	 large,	
diversified	market	 of	 user	 firms,	 like	 that	
in	which	German	mechanical	 engineering	
firms	 operate.	 In	 this	 case,	 specialisation	
and	economies	of	 scale	 combine	 to	enhance	
firms'	performance.	True,	 these	differences	
between	 industrial	 spaces	can	be	explained	
by	 historical	 contingencies	 (in	France,	 for	
example,	 the	emphasis	placed	by	 the	State	
on	 the	development	 of	 the	aeronautics	 and	
defence	 industries,	 and	 in	 Germany	 the	
conquest	 of	 a	 large	 export	market),	 but	
the	 essential	 thing	 is	 to	 understand	 how	
industrial	 spaces,	 qualificational	 spaces	 and	
organisational	spaces	are	articulated.
C) The linkage between specialisation and 
diversification
　One	 characteristic	 common	 to	 both	 the	
French	and	German	machine-tool	 industries	
is	 specialisation,	 although	 it	 takes	different	
forms	in	the	two	countries;	one	characteristic	
of	 Japanese	 firms,	 or	 at	 least	 the	 larger	
ones,	 is	 diversification.	This	 characteristic	
poses	 a	 problem	 for	 economists:	 although	
diversification	reduces	risks	for	a	firm	in	the	
long	 term,	 it	 increases	 them	 considerably	
in	 the	 short	 term,	 s ince	 i t 	 e l iminates	
the	 advantages	 of	 specialisation.	 Over	 a	
more	 or	 less	 long	 period,	 diversification	
is	 costly	 and	 tends	 to	 reduce	profitability.	
It	makes	 it	 necessary	 to	modify	 a	 firm's	
internal	 operations,	 and	 possibly	 even	 to	
restructure	 the	whole	 organisation:	 failure	
occurs	 if	 the	 organisation	 does	 not	 adapt	
to	 the	 new	policy.	Chandler	 in	‘Strategy	
and	 Structure’	 (1962/1998)	 stresses	 this	
point:	 the	organisation	of	 the	 firm	must	be	
adapted	when	 it	 starts	 to	produce	 several	
products:	decentralisation	of	decision-making	
powers	and	the	substitution	of	an	operational	
structure	 (based	 on	 product	 lines)	 for	 a	
functional	structure.	Under	 these	conditions,	
a	firm	can	reap	the	benefits	of	diversification	
(economies	 of	 scope).	The	problem	 then	 is	
how	 to	 understand	what	 determines	 the	
choice	between	the	two	strategies.
　Whi le 	 i t 	 i s 	 t rue 	 that 	 mach ine 	 too l	
production	 is	nowhere	confined	 to	specialist	
firms	 (in	France,	 car	makers,	 aeronautics	
companies	 and	 telecommunications	 firms	
produce	 some	 of	 their	 own	machines),	 it	
is	much	more	 common	 for	 Japanese	 firms	
in	 this	 sphere	 to	be	 involved	 in	a	 range	of	
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different	 activities.	More	 than	 half	 of	 the	
firms	engaged	 in	 the	manufacture	of	metal	
machine	tools	are	involved	in	other	activities.	
On	the	other	hand	 -	and	this	 is	a	specifically	
Japanese	 characteristic	 -,	 subcontracting	 in	
this	area	is	much	more	widespread	than	it	is	
in	France.	 It	 involves	a	considerable	number	
of	very	small	firms	 (more	than	1000	of	 them	
have	 fewer	 than	30	employees,	 classified	as	
‘establishments’	 in	 Japanese	 statistics)	
(Nohara,	 1987).	This	 is	 further	compounded	
by	 the	 practice	 of	 creating	 networks	 of	
subsidiaries	around	 large	parent	companies,	
with	 the	 largest	 ones	actually	 consisting	of	
groups	 of	 autonomous	 but	 interconnected	
companies.
　This	diversification	 of	 production	 and	 of	
the	sources	of	production	creates	a	particular	
kind	 of	 industrial	 space,	 characterised	 by	
proximity	 or	 even	 intermingling	 between	
producers	 and	 users .	 This	 blurring	 of	
the	 dist inct ion	 between	 special isat ion	
and	 diversification	 explains	 one	 of	 the	
characteristics	of	 the	Japanese	machine-tool	
industry.	Unlike	 their	French	counterparts,	
Japanese	machine	 tool	manufacturers	 tend	
not	 to	 design	 special	 machines	 adapted	
precisely	 to	meet	 customers'	needs;	 rather,	
they	take	standard,	relatively	unsophisticated	
machines	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 designing	 related	
equipment	or	peripherals	 intended	 to	make	
the	machines	easier	 to	use	or	more	efficient.	
These	modifications	 are	 implemented	 on	
the	 customer's	 premises	 not,	 as	might	 be	
imagined	 from	knowledge	of	French	 firms,	
under	 the	 supervision	 of	 engineers	 and	
technicians	working	in	a	technical	department	
or	methods	 office,	 but	 on	 the	 shop	 floor,	
where	engineers	and	machine	operators	work	
closely	 together.	Thus	 the	diversification	of	
Japanese	firms	seems	to	be	a	choice	linked	to	
their	 type	of	‘qualificational	 space’	 (high	
capacity	 for	 cooperation	produced	by	 firm-
based	cooperative	training).
D) The linkage between research and production
　Finally,	 account	 has	 to	 be	 taken	 of	 the	
linkage	between	research	and	development	
and	production.	This	linkage	takes	a	particular	
form	in	each	country:	predominantly	publicly-
funded	research	in	France,	university-industry	
links	 in	Germany,	predominantly	 firm-based	
research	 in	Japan.	However,	 it	 is	not	simply	
a	question	of	a	volume	effect.	 	Nohara	 (1987)	
points	to	the	following	characteristics	of	large	
Japanese	electronics	firms:
1 ) 	 the 	 c lose 	 l inks 	 between	 R&D	 and	
production,	which	impart	technical	continuity	
and	coherence	to	the	 innovation	process	and	
find	concrete	expression	 in	 the	 job	stability	
and	 internal	 mobility	 that	 characterise	
engineers'	careers	;
2)	 the	 type	 of	 diversif ication	 strategy	
adopted,	 involving	the	creation	of	a	network	
of	 subsidiaries	 around	 the	parent	 company	
which	provide	a	basis	for	mobilising	the	firm's	
or	group's	internal	resources	;
3)	 the	 interaction	 between	 this	 form	 of	
diversification	and	competition	in	the	industry	
as	a	whole:	since	all	firms	operate	in	virtually	
all	 areas	of	 the	electronics	 industry,	 "catch-
up"	 innovation,	 as	 opposed	 to	 "clean-break"	
innovation,	is	encouraged	by	the	transmission	
of	knowledge	.
　Thus	the	capacity	for	innovation	associated	
with	the	wide	range	of	activities	undertaken	
by	Japanese	firms	seems	to	be	based	on	the	
link	between	 the	mode	of	 human	 resource	
mobil isation	 and	 the	 form	 of	 company	
organisation	and	activity,	which	constitutes	
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a	distinctive	 combination	 of	 structure	 and	
strategy	 in	which	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 state,	 as	
Chandler	does,	which	determines	 the	other:	
the	strategies	of	 the	various	actors	 (workers,	
engineers	 and	managers)	 develop	 through	
the	 creation	 of	 efficient	qualificational	 and	
organisational	 spaces	at	 the	 firm,	group	and	
industry	level.
　In	 this	model,	 large	 firms	play	a	decisive	
role	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 R&D	 capacity .	
However,	this	is	not	to	say	that	there	is	‘one	
best	way’.	Other	 forms	of	 linkage	between	
production	and	R&D	can	also	be	effective.
　In	 this	 connection,	 it	 is	worth	 recalling	
Alfred	 Marshal l ’s	 observations	 on	 the	
small	 entrepreneur:	 "And	 though	he	must	
always	remain	at	a	disadvantage	 in	getting	
information	and	 in	making	experiments,	yet	
in	this	matter	the	general	course	of	progress	
is	 on	his	 side.	For	External	 economies	 are	
constantly	 growing	 relatively	 to	 Internal	
in	 al l 	 matters	 of	 Trade-knowledge	…"	
(Marshall	1891);	in	other	words,	"public	goods"	
outmatch	 private	 goods	 (Dosi	 1988).	 From	
this	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 separation	between	
universities	 and	 industry	 in	 the	 French	
model	 has	 the	 advantage	 of	 producing	 an	
abundant	 supply	 of	 high-level	 engineers	
who	are	made	available	to	firms	through	the	
market,	with	zero	transaction	costs:	since	the	
supply	 is	not	organised	 (except	 in	 so	 far	as	
pay	determination	may	be	 influenced	by	the	
differentiation	between	university	engineers	
and	 those	produced	by	 the	grandes	écoles),	
the	 suppliers	have	no	 incentive	 to	develop	
an	 opportunistic	 attitude	 of	 desertion.	The	
problem	 in	French	firms	 is	not	so	much	the	
separation	between	research	and	 industry	 in	
the	wider	society	but	rather	the	failure	to	link	
the	research	and	production	functions	at	firm	
level.	 In	 Japanese	 firms,	 at	 least	 the	 larger	
ones,	 this	problem	 is	 resolved	by	socialising	
engineers	by	putting	 them	 to	work	on	 the	
shop	 floor,	 that	 is	by	using	organisation	 to	
construct	 a	 qualificational	 space.	 French	
engineers	trained	at	the	‘Arts	et	Métiers’	
engineering	school	undergo	the	same	kind	of	
socialisation,	but	 it	 takes	place	 in	 the	school	
and	at	a	lower	technical	level	than	that	of	the	
grandes	écoles.	This	example	again	 reveals	
the	 importance	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 the	
qualificational	 space,	which	determines	not	
only	 the	 propensity	 to	 cooperate	 but	 also	
the	ability	of	 the	organisation	to	outperform	
its	 rivals	 in	 the	market	 and	 to	 reduce	 its	
transaction	costs.
Ⅳ. Towards a new approach to 'institutionalism'?
　The	preceding	remarks	lead	us	to	emphasise	
the	importance	of	the	role	of	institutions	in	the	
learning	process.	This	 term	 is	used	here	 to	
mean	"a	group	of	socio-economic	rules	set	up	
in	historic	conditions,	over	which	 individuals	
or	groups	of	 individuals	basically	have	 little	
control	 in	 the	short	and	middle	 term.	From	
an	economic	point	 of	view,	 these	 rules	 are	
intended	 to	define	 the	 conditions	 in	which	
individual	or	collective	choices	concerning	the	
allocation	and	utilisation	of	resources	can	be	
made"	(Ménard	1995).
　These	 institutions	 	 thus	 contribute	 to	
defining	the	socio-historic	conditions	in	which	
learning	processes	can	be	instituted	properly.	
More	 precisely,	 they	 are	 conceived	 as	
mechanisms	that	regulate	economic	functions	
characterised	by	relations	between	individuals	
or	groups	of	 individuals	where	an	element	of	
power,	 or	 the	balance	of	power	necessarily	
intervenes.
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　In	this	context,	 the	role	of	 the	 institutional	
mechanisms	 is	 to	 structure	 habits	 into	
routines	which	minimise	the	uncertainty	of	a	
changing	world	and	orient	the		future	actions	
of	 the	 firms	or	organisations.	 Insofar	as	 the	
collecting	and	processing	of	 information	are	
sources	of	uncertainty	 for	 the	organisation,	
routines	may	be	 considered	 as	models	 for	
organisational	 learning,	 for	 the	 acquisition	
of	 information	about	 the	 state	of	 the	world	
and	 for	 the	 improvement	 of	 organisational	
capacity.
　Institutions	thus	play	a	fundamental	role	in	
learning	processes	within	 the	organisations.	
Indeed, 	 the ,organisat ions	 develop	 the	
knowledge	and	know-how	of	 their	members	
by	 institutionalising	the	 learning	process	and	
improving	the	routines	of	the	organisation	as	a	
whole.	Learning	may	therefore	be	interpreted	
as	a	collective	process	of	acquiring	knowledge	
or	 it	may	be	 defined	more	 generally	 as	 a	
collective	process	of	accumulating	knowledge	
or	know-how	and	memorising	 them.	Above	
all,	 this	 process	 involves	 people	 in	 their	
economic	activity	but	 takes	place	 in	a	much	
broader	societal	context.	 If	 it	 is	undoubtedly	
a	phenomenon	 that	 relies	 on	 the	 individual	
agent,	 it	 is	 necessarily	 embedded	 in	 the	
organisations,	 that	 is,	 in	 the	 institutional	
forms	taken	by	economic	and	social	relations.	
The	members	 of	 the	 organisation	 involved	
in	 the	 learning	process	modify	 their	 basic	
knowledge.	What	 is	 at	 stake	 is	 thus	 the	
construction	of	a	 shared	base	of	knowledge	
which	 is	 shaped	and	which	evolves	 through	
social	 institutions,	 such	as	 rules,	 languages	
and	culture,	which	preserve	and	modify	 the	
quantity	 of	 collective	 knowledge.	On	 this	
basis,	 the	 firms	may	be	considered	as	social	
institutions	 that	shape,	preserve	and	modify	
this	base	of	common	knowledge.	
　We	 thus	 arr ive	 at 	 the	 conc lus ion - -
necessarily	provisional--that	 the	 firm	 is	not	
only	a	site	of	memorisation	and	transmission	
of	 routines,	 of	 knowledge	 that	 is	 difficult	
to	 codify,	 but	 also	 a	 social	 institution	 that	
promotes	the	relations	of	confidence	necessary	
to	 technological	 innovation	 and	growth	 in	
general.	But	even	more,	 the	 firm	allows	 the	
safeguarding	of	routines	and	knowledge	that	
are	otherwise	difficult	or	impossible	to	codify:	
"By	 examining	 the	 function	 of	 habits	 and	
routines	in	transmitting	technological	skill	and	
information,	and	in	turn	the	role	of	the	firm	in	
protecting	and	reproducing	these	routines,	we	
can	see	that	the	'technological'	and	the	'social'	
are	 inextricably	bound	 together"	 (Hodgson	
1988).
　In	 the	 societal	 approach,	 the	 firm	 tends	
to	be	analysed	not,	or	not	solely,	as	a	set	of	
contracts	 or	 a	 production	 function,	 but	 as	
a	 collective	actor	whose	efficiency	depends	
on	 a	 number	 of	 determinants	 that	 can	be	
analysed	separately	but	work	 in	 interaction	
with	each	other.	The	action	of	the	individuals	
and	groups	 that	make	up	 the	 firm	depends	
on	the	quality	of	 the	social	relationships	that	
bind	 them	together,	 and	 it	 is	on	analysis	of	
the	nature	of	 these	social	 relations	 that	 the	
societal	approach	concentrates.
　These	 social	 relations,	 through	which	
individual	 and	 collective	 actors	 and	 the	
relationships	between	 them	are	constructed,	
find	expression	in	the	notion	of	 (occupational,	
organisational	 and	 industrial)	 spaces.	The	
actors	are	constructed	by	 the	 training	 they	
receive	 and	 the	way	 in	 which	 they	 are	
integrated	and	shaped	within	the	organisation,	
which	constructs	 relationships	between	 the	
actors	based	on	cooperation,	 competition	or	
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negotiation.	The	 relations	 are	 constructed	
by	 the	 firm,	but	 the	construction	process	 is	
based	on	the	social	relations	 it	 inherits	when	
it	hires	 individuals	constructed	 in	 the	wider	
society,	 notably	 in	 the	 education	 system,	
which	 itself	depends	on	demand	 from	 firms	
and	 the	 social	 structure.	The	 construction	
of	both	 individual	and	collective	actors	 -	 the	
firm	being	one	of	 these	actors	 -	 takes	place	
through	a	process	made	up	of	a	sequence	of	
interdependent	operations:	 the	organisation	
depends	on	the	education	and	training	system	
and	 on	 the	 social	 structure	 and	 helps	 in	
turn	to	determine	them.	 In	this	way,	spaces,	
processes	and	actors	are	constructed	which	
determine	 the	quality	 of	 social	 relations	 in	
the	firm.	Thus	it	can	be	said	that	the	firm	is	
conceived	as	an	element	 in	 society	 -	hence	
its	 specificity	 -,	 but	 that	 the	nature	of	 that	
specificity	 can	be	 analysed	 on	 the	basis	 of	
fundamental	principles,	namely	 the	 types	of	
social	 relations,	 spaces	 and	processes	 that	
comparative	 societal	 analysis	has	helped	 to	
identify.
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